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1 Introduction
In this paper we explore asset-pricing implications of innovation. We concentrate on two
effects of innovation. First, while innovation expands the productive capacity of the economy,
it increases competitive pressure on existing firms and workers, reducing profits of existing
firms and eroding the human capital of older workers. Thus, innovation creates a risk factor,
which we call the “displacement risk factor.” Second, since economic rents from innovation
are captured largely by the future cohorts of inventors through the firms they create, existing
agents cannot use financial markets to avoid the negative effects of displacement. Innovation
risks cannot be perfectly shared even if a complete menu of state-contingent claims is available
for trading, since the future innovators, who are yet to enter the economy, are not able to
trade with the current population of agents.
We capture the displacement effect in an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium
economy. We model production with multiple intermediate goods that are used to produce
a single consumption good. Innovation creates a stochastically expanding variety of inter-
mediate goods. Intermediate goods are partial substitutes, therefore growth in their variety
intensifies competition between their producers and leads to displacement of the established
firms by the new entrants. In addition, older workers are not as well adapted to the new
technologies as the new cohorts of agents, which implies that innovation diminishes older
workers’ human capital. Thus, there are two sides to innovation. The bright side is the
increased productivity it brings, which raises aggregate output, consumption, and wages.
The dark side is the reduced wage-bill and consumption shares of the older agents.
The displacement risk faced by older agents is a systematic risk factor, and distinct from
aggregate-consumption risk. Individual Euler equations in our model cannot be aggregated
into a pricing model based solely on aggregate consumption because of the wedge between
the future consumption of all agents present currently and the future aggregate consumption:
the latter includes the consumption of future cohorts, but the former does not. This wedge
is stochastic and driven by innovation shocks. Thus, the standard aggregate-consumption-
based pricing model must be augmented with the displacement risk factor. This argument
helps explain several important empirical patterns in asset returns.
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First, the displacement risk factor is connected to cross-sectional differences in stock
returns. We assume that existing firms participate in innovation, but some firms are more
likely to innovate than others. The more innovative firms derive a larger fraction of their
value from future inventions and earn higher valuation ratios, which makes them “growth
firms.” Because of their relatively high exposure to the innovation shocks, growth firms offer
a hedge against displacement risk and, in equilibrium, earn lower average returns than less
innovative “value firms.” Thus, heterogeneous exposure to displacement risk helps explain
the positive average return premium earned by value stocks relative to growth stocks, called
the value premium. Moreover, innovation shocks generate co-movement among value stocks
and among growth stocks, giving rise to a value-growth factor in stock returns. Hence, our
model rationalizes the empirical success of a multi-factor model featuring a value-growth
factor, documented by Fama and French (1993).
Second, the aggregate equity premium in our model is boosted by the stock-market
exposure to the displacement risk factor. Large innovation shocks simultaneously lower the
value of existing firms through increased competition and reduce consumption of existing
agents through the erosion of their human and financial wealths. As a result, agents require
a higher premium to hold stocks than could be inferred from the aggregate consumption
series using standard pricing models.
Third, the equilibrium interest rate in our model is lower than suggested by the aggregate
consumption process and agents’ preferences. This is because individual agents’ consumption
growth is lower on average and riskier than that of aggregate consumption. This property
of overlapping-generation economies is noted in the seminal paper of Blanchard (1985) and
emphasized recently in an asset-pricing context by Gaˆrleanu and Panageas (2007).1
Our model also has implications for the cointegration properties of a) the dividends paid
by all corporations that current agents can trade and b) the dividends paid by all firms at any
point in time t, which we refer to as “aggregate” dividends. The latter are cointegrated with
(in fact, a constant fraction of) aggregate consumption. However, the former are not, since
1Allowing for some degree of “catching up with the Joneses,” as in Abel (1990), magnifies the size of this
effect.
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the future share of aggregate output accruing to the firms existing currently declines towards
zero asymptotically due to innovation. The lack of cointegration is empirically realistic and
has been recently recognized in the literature as quantitatively important for understanding
aggregate market returns.
We test the implications of our model empirically. We identify innovation shocks through
their effect on the consumption of individual cohorts and show that inter-generational differ-
ences in consumption correlate with the return differences between value and growth stocks.
In addition to the empirical tests, we use the empirical moments to calibrate our model and
verify that its mechanism can reproduce key asset-pricing patterns quantitatively.
Our paper relates to several strands of the literature. A number of papers use an
overlapping-generations framework to study asset-pricing phenomena, e.g., Abel (2003), Con-
stantinides et al. (2002), Geanakoplos et al. (2004), DeMarzo et al. (2004, 2008), Gaˆrleanu
and Panageas (2007), Gomes and Michaelides (2008), or Storesletten et al. (2007). None
of these papers, however, considers the displacement risk, which lies at the core of all our
results. Our model of innovation is similar to Romer (1990), who studies endogenous sources
of growth in a deterministic setting. We treat growth as exogenous and instead focus on
the impact of stochastic innovation on financial-asset returns. Consistent with the premise
of our model, Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) document the permanent negative impact of
innovation on incumbent firms in the context of the IT revolution. However, they employ a
representative-agent framework and hence do not consider the displacement risk of innova-
tion across agents.
Our paper also contributes to the theoretical literature on cross-sectional patterns in
stock returns, which includes Berk et al. (1999), Gala (2005), Gomes et al. (2003), Carlson
et al. (2004, 2006), Papanikolaou (2007), and Zhang (2005) among many. Our contribution is
the new approach to the value-premium puzzle. Many of the earlier papers, (e.g., Berk et al.
(1999) and Zhang (2005)) use partial or industry equilibrium settings with exogenous pricing
of risk. Existing general equilibrium models, (e.g., Gomes et al. (2003)) satisfy the aggregate-
consumption CAPM (CCAPM) and thus do not address the challenge of reconciling the value
premium with the standard CCAPM empirically. In contrast, we propose a novel source of
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systematic risk that accounts for return differences between value and growth stocks. Our
model implies that the standard CCAPM fails to capture this risk factor.
We also contribute to the vast literature on the equity-premium puzzle, (e.g., Mehra
and Prescott (1985), Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). The displacement risk factor helps
reconcile a high equity premium with a smooth time series of aggregate consumption.
Finally, we relate to the empirical literature that studies departures from perfect con-
sumption insurance between cohorts (e.g., Abel and Kotlikoff (2001), Attanasio and Davis
(1996)). Papers in that literature do not address the implications of such departures for
asset pricing, as we do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate and in Section
3 we solve our model. Section 4 analyzes qualitative properties of the model, and Section 5
contains a quantitative evaluation, including empirical tests. Section 6 concludes. We collect
technical results and proofs in Appendix A. To save space, we present a number of model
extensions and additional results in an extended appendix, available online.
2 Model
2.1 Agents’ Preferences and Demographics
We consider a model with discrete and infinite time: t ∈ {. . . , 0, 1, 2, . . .}. The size of the
population is normalized to 1. At each date a mass λ of agents, chosen randomly, die, and a
mass λ of agents are born, so that the population remains constant. An agent born at time
s has preferences of the form
Es
s+τ∑
t=s
β(t−s)
(
cψt,s
(
ct,s
Ct
)1−ψ)1−γ
1− γ , (1)
where τ is the (geometrically distributed) time of death, ct,s is the agent’s consumption at
time t, Ct is aggregate consumption at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective discount factor,
γ > 0 is the agent’s relative risk aversion, and ψ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant. Preferences of the
form (1) were originally proposed by Abel (1990), and are commonly referred to as “keeping-
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up-with-the-Joneses” preferences. When ψ = 1, these preferences specialize to the standard
constant-relative-risk-aversion preferences. In general, for ψ ∈ [0, 1] agents place a weight ψ
on their own consumption (irrespective of what others are consuming) and a weight 1 − ψ
on their consumption relative to average consumption in the population. Our qualitative
results hold independently of the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses feature, which only helps at
the calibration stage, by reducing the value of the interest rate.
A standard argument allows us to integrate over the distribution of the stochastic times
of death and re-write preferences of the form (1) as
Es
∞∑
t=s
[(1− λ) β](t−s)
(
cψt,s
(
ct,s
Ct
)1−ψ)1−γ
1− γ . (2)
2.2 Technology
Final-Good Firms
There is a representative (competitive) final-good producing firm that produces the single
final good using two categories of inputs: a) labor and b) a continuum of intermediate goods.
Letting LFt denote the efficiency units of labor that enter into the production of the final
good, At the number of intermediate goods available at time t, and xj,t the quantity of
intermediate good j used in the production of the final good, the production function of the
final-good producing firm is
Yt = Zt
(
LFt
)1−α [∫ At
0
ωj,t (xj,t)
α dj
]
. (3)
In this equation, Zt is a stochastic productivity process, which follows a random walk (in
logs) with drift µ and volatility σε:
log(Zt+1) = log(Zt) + µ+ εt+1, εt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2ε). (4)
The constant α ∈ [0, 1] in equation (3) controls the relative weight of labor and intermediate
goods in the production of the final good, while ωj,t captures the relative importance placed
on the various intermediate goods. We specify ωj,t as
ωj,t =
(
j
At
)χ(1−α)
, χ ≥ 0. (5)
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For χ = 0, the production function (3) is identical to the one introduced by the seminal
Romer (1990) paper in the context of endogenous growth theory. Our version is slightly more
general, since the factor weights ωj,t, which are increasing functions of the intermediate good
index j, allow the production function to exhibit a “preference” for more recent intermediate
goods. As we show below, this feature confers an additional degree of control over the
individual-firm profit variability, which is helpful for calibration purposes.
Even though our aim here is not to explain the sources of growth in the economy, the
production function (3) is useful for our purposes for several reasons: a) innovation, i.e., an
increase in the variety of intermediate goods (At) helps increase aggregate output; b) there
is rivalry between existing and newly arriving intermediate goods, in the sense that increases
in At strengthen the competition among intermediate-good producers, and c) heterogeneity
in intermediate, rather than final, goods is technically convenient, since we can keep one unit
of the final good as numeraire throughout. An exact illustration of the first two properties
is provided in the next section, where we solve the model.
At each point in time t, the representative final-good firm chooses LFt and xj,t (for j ∈
[0, At]) so as to maximize its profits:
piFt = max
LFt ,xj,t
{
Yt −
∫ At
0
pj,txj,tdj − wtLFt
}
, (6)
where pj,t is the price of intermediate good j and wt is the prevailing wage (per efficiency
unit of labor).
Intermediate-Good Firms
The intermediate goods xj,t are produced by monopolistically competitive firms that own
non-perishable blueprints to the production of these goods. Each intermediate good is pro-
duced by a single firm, while a single firm may produce a measure-zero set of intermediate
goods. We assume that the production of the intermediate good j ∈ [0, At] requires one unit
of labor (measured in efficiency units) per unit of intermediate good produced, so that the
total number of efficiency units of labor used in the intermediate-goods sector is
LIt =
∫ At
0
xj,tdj. (7)
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The price pj,t of intermediate good j maximizes the profits of the intermediate-good pro-
ducer, taking the demand function of the representative final good firm xj (pj,t; pj′ 6=j,t, wt) ≡
arg maxxj,t pi
F
t as given. To simplify notation, we shall write xj,t (pj,t) instead of xj,t (pj,t; pj′ 6=j,t, wt) .
Production of the intermediate good j generates profits2
piIt (j) = max
pj,t
{(pj,t − wt)xj,t(pj,t)} . (8)
2.3 Arrival of New Intermediate Goods and New Agents
New Products
The number of intermediate goods At expands over time as a result of innovations. Given
our focus on asset pricing, we assume that the innovation process is exogenous for simplicity.
The number of intermediate goods in our economy follows a random walk (in logs):3
log (At+1) = log(At) + ut+1. (9)
We assume a single aggregate innovation shock for simplicity. As we show in the (online)
extended appendix (Section ??), our analysis extends to a multi-sector economy with corre-
lated sectoral innovation shocks. The increment ut+1 is i.i.d. across time for simplicity. To
ensure its positivity, we assume that ut+1 is Gamma distributed
4 with shape parameter k
and scale parameter ν.
The intellectual property rights for the production of the ∆At+1 ≡ At+1−At new interme-
diate goods belong either to arriving agents or to existing firms. We assume that a fraction
κ ∈ [0, 1] of the total value of the new blueprints is allocated to arriving entrepreneurs,
while the complementary fraction 1−κ is introduced by established firms and hence belongs
indirectly to existing agents, who own these firms.
2Any firm produces a zero-measure set of intermediate goods. Hence, there are no feedback effects of the
pricing of any subset of intermediate goods it produces on the demand for any other intermediate goods.
Therefore, the firm maximizes its profits from each intermediate good separately.
3We choose a random-walk specification in order to ensure that aggregate consumption is a random
walk. The assumption of a random walk implies that — for a given ut+1 — the increase in production is
proportional to the current level of production. This assumption is routinely used in the literature and is
sometimes referred to as “standing on the shoulders of giants”. See, e.g., Jones (1997).
4The gamma probability density function f(x) is proportional to xk−1e−x/ν .
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While we assume that the arrival of new innovation and the allocation of the proceeds
from innovation are exogenous, we note that we could extend the model to obtain similar
allocations in a world with endogeneous innovation.5 Given the asset-pricing focus of the
paper, such an extension would add complexity without altering the intuitions or the results,
and therefore we omit it.
Workers
New agents are of two types and differ according to their endowments: Entrepreneurs account
for a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of new agents and arrive in life with ideas for new firms. We discuss
them in the next subsection. In this subsection we focus on workers, who make up a fraction
1 − φ of new agents. Workers start life with a constant endowment of h hours per period,
which they supply inelastically. The ratio of efficiency units of labor to hours is affected by
two factors: a) age and experience, and b) skill obsolescence. To capture the first notion,
we assume that the ratio of labor efficiency units to hours changes geometrically with age at
the rate δ, so that in the absence of skill obsolescence, the ratio of a worker’s endowment of
efficiency units at time t to the respective endowment at the time of birth s ≤ t is given by
(1 + δ)t−s.
To motivate the second notion (skill obsolescence), we note that in the real world younger
workers are likely to be more productive in the presence of increased technological complexity
than older workers. One potential reason is that younger workers’ education gives them the
appropriate skills for understanding the technological frontier. By contrast, older workers
are likely to be challenged by technological advancements. In the extended online appendix
(Section ??) we present a simple vintage model of the labor market that introduces imperfect
substitution across labor supplied by agents born at different times. To expedite the presen-
tation of the main results, in this section we assume that labor is a homogenous good and
that workers’ endowment of efficiency units depreciates in a way that replicates the outcome
of the more elaborate vintage model.
5In such an extension, At would play the role of a shock to the innovation sector. Additionally, we would
need appropriate assumptions on the relative productivity of different groups of innovators, so as to obtain
the same allocation of the proceeds from innovation that we assume here.
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Specifically, we assume that a worker’s total supply of efficiency units of labor is given
by h (1 + δ)t−s qt,s with
log(qt+1,s) = log(qt,s)− ρut+1 (10)
and ρ ≥ 0. This specification captures the idea that advancements of the technological
frontier act as depreciation shocks to the productivity of old workers. Such shocks generate
cohort effects in individual consumption and income, which are present in historical data, as
we show in Section 5.1. We normalize the initial endowment of efficiency units so that the
aggregate number of efficiency units in the economy is constant. In particular, we set
qs,s = 1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρus (11)
and h = 1
λ
. We assume that (1− λ) (1 + δ) ≤ 1. As a result, the number of per-worker
efficiency units, Lt/ (1− φ) with Lt = LFt + LIt , is always equal to 1, and hence h¯(1 +
δ)t−sqt,sλ(1− λ)t−s can be interpreted as the fraction of total wages that accrues to workers
born at time s.6 We note in passing that, in the interest of parsimony, the baseline model
assumes no intra-cohort heterogeneity among workers, such as, labor-income heterogeneity
due to educational choice at the time of birth. In the extended appendix (Section ??), we
extend the model to allow for education level choice at birth. This assumption gives rise
to a skill premium in income. The skill premium is higher within cohorts that enter the
workforce at times of rapid technological advancement (as captured by the shock us), which
is consistent with the evidence in Attanasio and Davis (1996).7
Entrepreneurs and New Value and Growth Firms
Entrepreneurs arrive endowed with ideas for new blueprints. They start a continuum of firms
that produce the respective intermediate goods, and introduce them into the stock market.
6Note that, with z = (1− λ)(1+δ), our assumptions imply
Lt
(1− φ) = λh¯
∑
s≤t
zt−sqt,s =
∑
s≤t
zt−s(1−ze−ρus)e−ρ
∑t
v=s+1 uv =
∑
s≤t
zt−se−ρ
∑t
v=s+1 uv−zt−s+1e−ρ
∑t
v=s uv = 1.
7The interaction between technology and the skill premium is also discussed in, e.g., Krusell et al. (2000).
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We assume that new firms are heterogeneous in their access to new blueprints in future
periods. How new blueprints are distributed among firms in future periods is only relevant
for the cross-section of stock returns and has no effect on aggregate prices and quantities.
Thus, our model affords considerable flexibility in modeling the cross-section of stock returns
and firm dynamics. For ease of exposition, we make a stylized assumption: some firms can
receive blueprints in future periods, while the remainder of the firms cannot. We refer to
the first type of firms as “growth” firms, and the latter type as “value” firms. Thus defined,
growth firms in the model trade at higher prices relative to their current earnings than value
firms, which mirrors the empirical definitions of growth and value firms. As we show in
Section 5.2, our model can generate realistic cross-sectional dispersion in valuation ratios
and expected returns among growth and value firms.8
Value firms created at time t are only entitled to a fraction ηκ of the value of blueprints
introduced in that period, where η ∈ (0, 1]. By contrast, new “growth” firms are entitled
to a fraction (1 − η)κ of the value of new blueprints at time t, but they also receive a
fraction of the new blueprints in future periods. Specifically, in period t, growth firms born
at s ∈ (−∞, t− 1] obtain a fraction
(1− κ)
(
1−$
$
)
$t−s (12)
of the value of the ∆At new blueprints. One can easily relax these stylized assumptions on
the distribution of new blueprints (say by introducing firm-specific shocks) so as to obtain
the desired cross-sectional distribution and dynamics of firm characteristics.9
To simplify matters, we assume that there are no intra-cohort differences among growth
firms and any two growth firms of the same cohort obtain the same value of blueprints in
8The cost of our stylized assumption on blueprint allocation is that the transition dynamics of firms
between value and growth portfolios is too simplistic compared to the documented empirical patterns. This
limitation in our treatment of firm dynamics is not critical for the main point of the paper and would be
relatively easy to overcome by specifying a richer, stochastic blueprint allocation schedule for all firms.
9Luttmer (2007) presents an interesting approach to explaining the size distribution of firms in a model
that shares some features with Romer (1990). Even though the size distribution does not matter for the
insights that we develop in this paper, the methods of Luttmer (2007) could be used to enrich the present
model so as to account for the size distribution.
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any given period. The geometric decay in the fraction of new blueprints that accrues to
a given growth firm as a function of its age ensures that asymptotically the total market
capitalization of firms existing at any given, fixed time t goes to zero as a fraction of the
aggregate market capitalization as time progresses. It also implies that today’s growth firms
become asymptotically value firms.
Despite the stylized distinction between value and growth firms, our model is consistent
with the well-documented fact that growth firms exhibit higher earnings growth than value
firms.10 In our model this characteristic is a direct consequence of the fact that growth firms
keep receiving blueprints after their creation, whereas value firms do not. Furthermore, the
average growth firm generates higher profits per blueprint that it owns than the average
value firm, since growth firms own newer vintages of blueprints than value firms and more
recent blueprints are more productive, given the production function (3), (5).11
2.4 Asset Markets
There exists a complete set of state-contingent claims. At each point in time existing agents
can trade in zero net supply Arrow-Debreu securities contingent on the joint realization of
future shocks εt+τ and ut+τ , ∀τ > 0. We denote the corresponding stochastic discount factor
by ξt, so that the time-s value of a claim paying Dt at time t is given by Es
ξt
ξs
Dt.
In addition, agents have access to annuity markets as in Blanchard (1985). (We refer the
reader to that paper for details). The joint assumptions of perfect spanning and frictionless
annuity markets simplifies the analysis considerably, since feasible consumption choices are
constrained by a single intertemporal budget constraint. For a worker, that intertemporal
10Specifically, in a well-known paper Fama and French (1995) document that growth firms exhibit (i)
higher rates of book value growth; (ii) higher profitability; and (iii) higher growth rates of earnings, relative
to value firms. For a recent contribution, see also Imrohoroglu and Tuzel (2011).
11To see this more clearly, note that, conditional on a firm’s age, a growth firm has blueprints not only
corresponding to the time of its creation, but also corresponding to more recent times. Hence conditional on
age, a growth firm exhibits higher profits per blueprint than a value firm. Since this higher profitability of
growth firms holds conditional on age, it also holds unconditionally, i.e., if one averages across age groups.
11
budget constraint is given by
Es
∞∑
t=s
(1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)
cwt,s = Es
∞∑
t=s
(1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)
wtqt,sh¯ (1 + δ)
t−s , (13)
where cwt,s denotes the time-t consumption of a representative worker who was born at time s.
The left-hand side of (13) represents the present value of a worker’s consumption, while the
right-hand side represents the present value of her income. Similarly, letting cet,s denote the
time-t consumption of a representative inventor who was born at time s, her intertemporal
budget constraint is
Es
∞∑
t=s
(1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)
cet,s =
1
λφ
Vs,s, (14)
where Vs,s is the time-s total market capitalization of new firms created at time s, and
therefore the right-hand side represents the wealth at birth of a representative inventor. In
order to determine the total market value of firms created at time s, let Πj,s be the present
value of profits from the production of intermediate good j:
Πj,s =
[
Es
∞∑
t=s
(
ξt
ξs
)
piIj,t
]
. (15)
The total market capitalization of all new firms can then be written as
Vs,s = κ
∫ As
As−1
Πj,sdj + (1−$)Es
∞∑
t=s+1
(
ξt
ξs
)
(1− κ)$t−s−1
∫ At
At−1
Πj,tdj. (16)
The first term in equation (16) is the value of the blueprints for the production of new
intermediate goods that are introduced by new firms (both “growth” and “value” firms) at
time s. The second term captures the value of “growth opportunities,” that is, the value of
blueprints to be received in future periods t > s by growth firms created at time s.
2.5 Equilibrium
The definition of equilibrium is standard. To simplify notation, we let φe and φw denote the
fractions of entrepreneurs and workers in the population, respectively.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a collection of adapted stochastic processes {xj,t, LFt , cwt,s,
cet,s, ξt, pj,t, wt} with j ∈ [0, At] and t ≥ s such that
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1. (Consumer optimality) Given ξt, the process c
w
t,s (respectively, c
e
t,s) solves the optimiza-
tion problem (2) subject to the constraint (13) (respectively, constraint [14]).
2. (Profit maximization) The prices pj,t solve the optimization problem (8) given L
F
t ,
xj′ 6=j,t, and wt, and LFt and xj,t solve the optimization problem (6) given pj,t and wt.
3. (Market clearing) Labor and goods markets clear
LFt + L
I
t = (1− φ) , (17)
λ
t∑
s=−∞
∑
i∈{w,e}
(1− λ)t−s φicit,s = Yt. (18)
3 Solution
3.1 Equilibrium Output, Profit, and Wages
Proposition 1 provides a closed-form expression for output, profits, and wage payments.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, aggregate output is given by
Yt =
(α2)
α
(
1−α
1+χ
)1−α
α2 + 1− α (1− φ)ZtA
1−α
t . (19)
The profit of the representative final-good firm is piFt = 0. The profits from the production of
intermediate good xj,t are positive, identical for all j, and given by
piIj,t = (1 + χ)
(
j
At
)χ
Yt
At
α (1− α) . (20)
Finally, aggregate profits are given by
∫ At
0
piIj,tdj = α (1− α)Yt, while aggregate wage pay-
ments equal (α2 + 1− α)Yt.
Proposition 1 establishes two important results. First, the number of intermediate inputs
(At) in equation (19) is raised to the power 1 − α. This means that aggregate output is
increasing in the number of intermediate inputs. However, the sensitivity of output to the
number of inputs depends on the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of
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intermediate goods. For instance, as α approaches 1, intermediate goods become perfect
substitutes, and a larger variety of intermediate goods leads to more competition among
firms and lower profits for existing intermediate-good producers without changing the overall
productive capacity of the economy.
Second, the time series of profits piIj,t from the production of a given intermediate good j
is not cointegrated with aggregate output Yt. The reason is that the variety of intermediate
goods At grows over time and hence pi
I
j,t/Yt → 0 as t → ∞. As a result, dividends of an
individual firm are not co-integrated with aggregate output, which is intuitive because of the
constant arrival of competing firms. In comparison, aggregate profits are a constant fraction
α (1− α) of total output.
A limitation of the model is that the reduction of the incumbent firms’ profits is driven
by reductions in the quantities of intermediate goods produced by incumbent firms, rather
than the relative prices that they charge. This feature of the model follows from the simple
monopolistic-competition structure of the model, which implies that all goods (irrespective of
the time since their introduction) are priced according to the constant-markup rule pIj,t =
wt
α
.
In reality, both price and quantity reductions lead to a fall of incumbent firm’s profits.12 For
our purposes and conclusions, all that matters is that total profits decline in units of the
numeraire (final good), be it through quantity or price effects. Accordingly, for our baseline
specification, we use the tractable structure of the Romer (1990) model. We discuss possible
extensions of the baseline model that generate declines in relative prices of older intermediate
goods vintages in the extended appendix (Section ??).
3.2 The Stochastic Discount Factor
To determine the stochastic discount factor ξt, we recall that, since agents have access to
a full set of state-contingent securities after their birth, a consumer’s lifetime consumption
profile can be obtained by maximizing (2) subject to a single intertemporal budget constraint
(constraint [13] if the agent is a worker and constraint [14] if the agent is an inventor).
Attaching a Lagrange multiplier to the intertemporal budget constraint, maximizing with
12See, e.g., Gort and Klepper (1982), Klepper and Graddy (1990), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994).
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respect to cit,s, and relating the consumption at time t to the consumption at time s for a
consumer born at s gives
cit,s = c
i
s,s
(
C
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
t
Cs(1−ψ)(1−γ)
β−(t−s)
ξt
ξs
)− 1
γ
for i ∈ {e, w}. (21)
From this equation, the aggregate consumption at any point in time is
Ct = λ
t∑
s=−∞
∑
i∈{w,e}
(1− λ)t−s φicis,s
(
C
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
t
Cs(1−ψ)(1−γ)
β−(t−s)
ξt
ξs
)− 1
γ
. (22)
Expressing Ct+1 in the same way and then using (22) gives
Ct+1 = (1− λ)Ct
(
β−1
C
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
t+1
Ct(1−ψ)(1−γ)
ξt+1
ξt
)− 1
γ
+ λ
∑
i∈{w,e}
φicit+1,t+1. (23)
Dividing both sides of (23) by Ct, solving for
ξt+1
ξt
, and noting that Ct = Yt in equilibrium
leads to
ξt+1
ξt
= β
(
Yt+1
Yt
)−1+ψ(1−γ)  1
1− λ
1− λ ∑
i∈{w,e}
φi
cit+1,t+1
Yt+1
−γ . (24)
To obtain an intuitive understanding of equation (24) it is easiest to focus on the case
ψ = 1, so that agents have standard CRRA preferences. In this case, the stochastic dis-
count factor is the product of the subjective discount factor β and two terms raised to the
power −γ. The first term is
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
, and it captures aggregate consumption growth. The
second term, namely 1
1−λ
(
1− λ∑ i∈{w,e} φi cit+1,t+1Yt+1 ), gives the proportion of output at time
t+1 that accrues to agents already alive at time t. Note that only a proportion 1 − λ of
existing agents survive between t and t + 1, and that the arriving generation claims a pro-
portion λ
∑
i∈{w,e} φ
i c
i
t+1,t+1
Yt+1
of aggregate output. The combination of these terms yields the
consumption growth between t and t+ 1 of the surviving agents.
Equation (24) states an intuitive point: since (ignoring consumption externalities) only
agents alive at time t are relevant for asset pricing, it is exclusively their consumption growth
that determines the stochastic discount factor, not the aggregate consumption growth, which
includes the consumption of agents born at time t+ 1.
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The failure of the aggregate-consumption CAPM (CCAPM) in our model is distinct from
earlier results obtained in incomplete-market economies (e.g., Constantinides and Duffie
(1996), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Basak and Cuoco (1998)), where various frictions and
constraints prevent perfect risk sharing among agents.13
To conclude the computation of equilibrium, we need to obtain an expression for the
consumption shares
cit,t
Yt
, i ∈ {w, e}. This can be done by using the intertemporal budget
constraints (14) and (13). Using the fact that the growth rates of consumption and output
in our model are i.i.d. over time, we show (see Proposition 2 in the Appendix) that
1− λ
∑
i∈{w,e}
φi
cit+1,t+1
Yt+1
= υ(ut+1; θ
e, θw, θg),
with
υ(ut+1; θ
e, θw, θg) ≡ 1− θeα (1− α) (κ (1− e−(1+χ)ut+1)+ (1−$) θg) (25)
−θw (α2 + 1− α) (1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρut+1)
and θe, θw, and θg three appropriate constants solving a system of three nonlinear equa-
tions in three unknowns. Given the interpretation of 1−υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg) as the fraction of
consumption that accrues to new agents, (1− λ)−1 υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg) captures the net ad-
justment applied to the aggregate consumption growth to obtain the consumption growth
of existing agents. Accordingly, we refer to (1− λ)−1 υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg) as the displacement
factor .
We conclude this subsection by noting that equation (24) is a robust implication of our
analysis. It only relies on the assumption that existing agents can trade in a full set of
13Consistent with Grossman and Shiller (1982), Krueger and Lustig (2010) show that non-traded idiosyn-
cratic income shocks by themselves may lead to imperfect risk sharing among existing agents, but are not
enough to invalidate the equity-premium implications of the CCAPM; they need to be interacted with fric-
tions or portfolio constraints. Our model abstracts from such issues, so that the consumption of existing
agents is perfectly correlated. Instead, the key economic mechanism is the failure of intergenerational risk
sharing. This qualitative distinction is important for empirical work: to test our model, one should look for
evidence of imperfect inter-generational risk sharing instead of imperfect risk sharing among existing agents.
We undertake this task in Section 5.
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state-contingent securities, so that their consumption is given by equation (21). Equation
(21) would still hold in several realistic, but inessential extensions of the model that would
allow for bequests and gifts across generations, government debt, intergenerational transfers
mandated by the government, or adjustable and depreciable physical and human capital.
Such extensions would not change the functional form of equation (24) and would only
affect the magnitude of the displacement factor.14 Our calibration of the model in Section 5
is robust to such extensions, because it is based directly on the magnitude of the displacement
factor in the data.
4 Qualitative Properties of the Equilibrium
To highlight the departure from the standard paradigm, we consider a limiting case of the
model with no aggregate consumption risk. The limit of no aggregate risk is not meant to
be a realistic description of market dynamics; instead, it helps clarify the intuition behind
displacement risk by eliminating other sources of consumption variability.
Specifically, suppose that σ = 0 and ρ > 0, and let α approach 1. Equation (19) implies
that the volatility of aggregate output, and of aggregate consumption, approaches zero.
Then, according to the standard CCAPM, risk premia must vanish in the limit. This is not
the case in our model, as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Assume that σ = 0, ρ > 0, κ = 1, and
1 > β (1− λ)γ eµψ(1−γ)+ 12σ2ψ2(1−γ)2 , (26)
1 ≤ β (1 + δ)−γ eµψ(1−γ)+ 12σ2ψ2(1−γ)2E[eργut+1 ]. (27)
14For instance, in an economy populated by a representative, altruistically-linked dynasty, bequests and
gifts between the different generations would ensure that every living member of the dynasty enjoys the same
consumption. Accordingly, arriving agents’ consumption is equal to per-capita output, and the displacement
factor is identically equal to one.
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Then, an equilibrium exists. Moreover, letting Rt be the return of any stock,
lim
α→1
V ar (∆Yt+1) = 0, (28)
lim
α→1
∂ (ξt+1/ξt)
∂ut+1
> 0, (29)
lim
α→1
{
E(Rt)−
(
1 + rf
)}
> 0. (30)
While the limiting case α = 1 is a special case of the model,15 the qualitative results in
Lemma 1, and in particular the existence of a distinct displacement risk factor, hold more
generally and illustrate why the CCAPM relationship can understate the risks associated
with investing in stocks.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. While the volatility of aggregate con-
sumption vanishes as α approaches 1, the volatility of existing agents’ consumption does not.
As α approaches 1, intermediate inputs behave more and more like perfect substitutes. This
implies that innovations have a vanishing effect on aggregate output, their only impact being
the redistribution from old to young firms and from old to young agents (since ρ > 0). Thus,
innovation shocks (ut) are systematic consumption shocks from the perspective of existing
agents and affect the pricing kernel as stated by (29), but they are not aggregate shocks
in the conventional sense. Since the profits of existing firms are exposed to the innovation
shocks (ut), stock returns of existing companies are correlated with the consumption growth
of existing agents and therefore command a risk premium.
Our model also generates a positive value premium without aggregate uncertainty. To
see this, consider a claim on future aggregate dividends,16 which include the dividends to
be paid by the current firms and the dividends to be paid by future firms — i.e., dividends
due to the exercise of growth opportunities. On the one hand, since aggregate output (and
hence aggregate dividends) is deterministic, the claim on aggregate dividends returns the
15A caveat behind Lemma 1 is that in the limit α = 1 the profits of intermediate-good firms disappear.
Hence, even though the rate of return on a stock is well defined in the limit (because rates of return are
not affected by the levels of dividends and prices), the limiting case α = 1 is of limited practical relevance.
However, it has theoretical interest, because it illustrates in a simple way the asset-pricing implications of
the wedge between aggregate consumption and existing agents’ consumption.
16We assume for the purpose of this illustration that such a claim has finite value.
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risk-free rate. On the other hand, this return is a weighted average of the return on current
firms — i.e., the market return that Lemma 1 shows to be higher than the risk-free rate
— and the return on growth opportunities. Thus, we conclude that there exists a positive
spread between average returns on assets in place and growth opportunities, which leads to
a positive value premium. Since there are no aggregate shocks, the value premium is driven
by innovation risk.
The positive value premium in our model is due to the fact that assets in place and the
value of growth opportunities have different exposures to the innovation shocks ut. Specif-
ically, the value of assets in place is negatively exposed to the innovation shock, while the
value of growth opportunities has a positive exposure. According to Lemma 1 (equation
[29]), innovation shocks command a positive price of risk, and therefore value stocks must
earn a higher average rate of return than growth stocks. From the point of view of the agents,
the claim on future growth opportunities embedded in growth stocks acts as a hedge against
innovation shocks, driving down the expected return on growth stocks. Thus, the rationale
behind the value premium in our model is quite different from the explanations proposed
previously.17 Existing models either take risk factors as exogenous and disconnected from
economic fundamentals, or derive equilibrium pricing relationships consistent with the con-
ditional CCAPM, in which case value stocks earn higher average returns because of their
higher exposure to the aggregate consumption risk. In our model there exists a fundamental
risk factor, distinct from aggregate consumption growth, that affects the return differential
between value and growth stocks.
The next lemma establishes a general relationship between realizations of the displace-
ment risk factor and stock returns.
Lemma 2 Let Φ ≡ ΠIj,t
piIj,t
, where j is the index of any intermediate good in [0, At], and Π
I
j,t is
17A representative sample of papers using structural models to analyze the value premium includes Berk
et al. (1999), Gomes et al. (2003), Carlson et al. (2004, 2006), and Zhang (2005).
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given by (15).18 Define
Rat+1 =
(
Φ
Φ− 1
)(
piIj,t+1
piIj,t
)
, ∀j ∈ [0, At], (31)
Rot+1 =
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
(1− κ) (1− e−(1+χ)ut+1)+$θg
θg
. (32)
Then, for any firm there exists wot ∈ [0, 1] known at time t such that the gross realized return
Rt+1 on the firm can be expressed as a weighted average of R
a
t+1 and R
o
t+1:
Rt+1 = (1− wot )Rat+1 + wotRot+1. (33)
Specifically, wot = 0 for value firms and w
o
t ∈ (0, 1) for growth firms. Furthermore,
∂Rat+1
∂ut+1
< 0,
∂Rot+1
∂ut+1
> 0. (34)
Lemma 2, which holds for any set of parameters, decomposes the gross return on any
stock as a weighted average of two basic returns, namely Rat+1 and R
o
t+1. R
a
t+1 is the gross
return on a value stock (assets in place), while Rot+1 can be interpreted as the gross return on
a pure “growth opportunity”, i.e., as the return on the component of a growth stock’s market
value that is associated with future rather than existing blueprints. The weight wot,s reflects
the fraction of a stock’s value that is due to growth opportunities. For instance, wot,s = 0
for a value stock, while wot,s ∈ (0, 1) for a growth stock. Equations (31), (32), (19), and (20)
imply that the difference log
(
Rat+1
)− log (Rot+1) is not affected by t+1, while equation (34)
shows that it is a declining function of ut+1. In light of equation (33), the same properties
hold true for the log-return differential between a portfolio of value stocks and a portfolio of
growth stocks.19 Thus, the log-return differential between value and growth stocks isolates
realizations of the displacement factor, and can act as an empirical proxy, or a “mimicking
portfolio,” for the unobserved displacement factor. This property of our model is supported
18The ratio Φ does not depend on the index j, and thus all value firms have the same P/E, regardless of
which intermediate goods they produce. Since the increments to the log stochastic discount factor and the
increments to log profits of value firms are i.i.d. across time, Φ is a constant. We show this formally as part
of the proof of Proposition 2.
19An implication of equation (33) is that the return of a stock is also a weighted average of the two basic
returns, Rat+1 and R
o
t+1.
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by the empirical success of asset pricing models featuring a multi-factor specification, which
includes a “value-minus-growth” return as one of the factors. (See Fama and French (1993).)
It is useful to note that, because the agent is able to constantly re-balance her portfolio
from one period to the next, she can create a factor-mimicking portfolio by simply combining
positions in the value and growth firms “of the day.” This feature of the model does not
rely on our stylized modeling of value and growth firms. For instance, an agent can obtain
her desired exposure to the realization of the displacement factor at time t+ 1 by constantly
re-balancing her portfolio to include appropriate short or long positions in new growth stocks
and value stocks.
We would also like to note that, in a multisector version of the baseline model20 with
correlated innovation shocks, we can show that the value-minus-growth return is likely to be
larger within sectors that experience innovation shocks rather than across sectors. This result
is consistent with the data, and intuitive. The firms that are most negatively affected by
new entrants are the entrants’ immediate competitors inside the sector, rather than distant
competitors in other sectors. Thus, market-value decline in response to a sector-specific
innovation shock is strongest for assets in place in the same sector, while market-value
appreciation is strongest for growth options in the same sector.
We conclude this section by discussing the relationship between the equilibrium stochastic
discount factor in our model and the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin CAPM. Without the consump-
tion externality in preferences (ψ = 1), the CAPM relationship holds in our model with
respect to the total wealth of existing agents, which includes both their stock holdings and
their human capital. The reason is that the ratio of consumption to total wealth is constant
in our model, and hence a reasoning similar to the one in Section 3.2 implies that when
ψ = 1, the stochastic discount factor can be expressed in terms of the growth rate of the
total wealth of existing agents.21 Since the two components of total wealth (financial wealth
and human capital) are not perfectly correlated inside the model, the stock market cannot be
used as a proxy for total wealth. This well-known critique of the empirical implementations
20This extension is contained in the extended online appendix (Section ??).
21More generally, when ψ < 1, the stochastic discount factor is an exponential affine function of the
aggregate consumption growth and the wealth growth of existing agents.
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of the CAPM applies, at a theoretical level, within our model.
5 Quantitative Evaluation
In this section we examine the model’s empirical implications and evaluate its quantitative
performance. Specifically, Section 5.1 derives two main observable implications. We show
that our theory predicts the presence of cohort effects in the cross section of consumption
data. Furthermore our model predicts that the permanent component of the time series
of cohort effects should be positively correlated with the return on a growth-minus-value
portfolio. We provide supporting statistical evidence for both of these assertions. In Section
5.2 we calibrate the model to approximately match several key empirical moments (especially
the cohort-related moments), and evaluate its implications for asset return dynamics. Section
5.3 further analyzes the sources of the model’s quantitative performance.
5.1 Cohort Effects and Asset Returns
According to the model, an individual agent’s log consumption can be decomposed into
cohort effects (as), time effects (bt), and individual-specific effects (εt
i, i ∈ {e, w}):
log cit,s = as + bt + εt
i, (35)
where, according to (21),
as =
∑
j∈{e,w}
φj log cjs,s +
1
γ
log
(
C(1−ψ)(1−γ)s β
−sξs
)
, (36)
bt = −1
γ
log
(
ξtβ
−tC(1−ψ)(1−γ)t
)
, (37)
εis = log c
i
s,s −
∑
j∈{e,w}
φj log cjs,s. (38)
The next lemma describes the evolution of the cohort effects according to the model.
Lemma 3 For any T ≥ 1, the cohort effect in individual consumption satisfies
as+T − as = −
T∑
i=1
log
(
υ (us+i)
1− λ
)
+ zs+T − zs, (39)
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where zs is a series of i.i.d. random variables defined by
zs = (1− φ) log
(
cws,s
Ys
)
+ φ log
{
ces,s
Ys
}
. (40)
Equation (39) shows why cohort analysis is useful for our purposes. First, it allows us
to test for the presence of perfect intergenerational risk sharing. Under perfect risk sharing
across generations, all cohort effects are zero.22 In contrast, cohort effects are non-zero
in our model and, moreover, they are non-stationary, since the first term on the right-
hand side of (39) is a random walk with drift. As we discuss at greater length in the
extended appendix (Section ??), these are robust and broad implications of most overlapping-
generations models, since they depend exclusively on two aspects of the model: the “Euler”
equation (21) and the fact that arriving generations obtain a stationary fraction of aggregate
consumption.
Second, under the same two basic assumptions, the permanent shocks to the consumption
cohort effects capture a central notion for our purposes: they isolate permanent variations
in the stochastic discount factor that are due to the lack of perfect intergenerational risk
sharing, rather than to permanent movements in aggregate output that are equally shared
across generations. In the context of our model, this notion is captured by the log displace-
ment factor log
(
υ(us+i)
1−λ
)
. Hence, equation (39) implies that by using standard econometric
techniques to isolate the variance of the permanent increments of consumption cohort effects,
we can obtain a measurement of the variance of the displacement factor.
Third, cohort effects allow us to exploit the cross-sectional dimension of the CEX data
set, rather than rely on its short time dimension. By using the cross-sectional dimension
of CEX data, we can estimate cohort effects for individuals that were born as early as the
first decades of the last century. This allows us to obtain a long time path of cohort effects
(about 80 years). In light of equation (39), this long path contains information about the
behavior of the displacement factor over the same period.
22The discussion at the end of Section 3.2 implies that, under perfect intergenerational risk sharing, indi-
vidual consumption equals aggregate consumption per capita irrespective of cohort. Accordingly, individual
consumption should exhibit time, but not cohort effects.
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We estimate cohort effects in CEX data by running a regression of household log con-
sumption on time and cohort dummies. A detailed description of the data is provided in
Appendix B. To make our results robust to the presence of age effects in the data (for
instance, due to borrowing constraints early in life, or changes in consumption patterns due
to the aging of children), we also allow for age effects, which we model by including either
flexible parametric spline functions of age or simply age dummies. We also include a control
for log household size.23
It is well understood in the empirical literature that linear trends in age, cohort, and
time effects cannot be identified separately if age effects are included in equation (35).24
However, it is possible to uniquely identify differences in differences of cohort effects (as+1−
as− (as− as−1)) without any normalizing assumptions and even after including a full set of
age dummies.25 Under the null hypothesis that all cohort effects are zero (as = 0), so should
be their differences in differences (as+1− 2as + as−1 = 0). Hence, the first hypothesis we test
is that as+1 − 2as + as−1 = 0 for all s. The three columns of Table 1 report the results of
estimating equation (35) including a) no age effects, b) parametric age effects, and c) a full
set of age dummies. The model with parametric age effects is fitted by assuming that age
effects are given by a cubic spline with knots at ages 33, 45, and 61. The first row reports
the results from a Wald test of as+1 − 2as + as−1 = 0 for all s. The second row reports the
associated p−values. The Wald test rejects the hypothesis that cohort effects are identically
zero.
23As a robustness check, we also adjust for family size by dividing by the average family-equivalence scales
reported in Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007). The two approaches produce very similar results,
since our estimate for the coefficient of log family size implies an adjusted household consumption that is
very similar to the average family-equivalence scales reported in Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).
24Some of the literature addresses this problem by following Deaton and Paxson (1994) and making the
normalizing assumption that the time effects add up to zero and are orthogonal to the time trend. In our
model, the time effects bt follow a random walk and hence such an assumption is not appropriate.
25See McKenzie (2006) for a proof. The easiest way to see why identification is possible is to allow for age
effects in equation (35) and note that equation log cit,s = as + bt + γt−s + ε
i implies
E log cit+1,s+1 − E log cit+1,s −
(
E log cit,s − E log cit,s−1
)
= as+1 − as − (as − as−1) .
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We document the magnitude of the variation of the cohort effects in the first four rows of
Table 2. The first row contains estimates of the standard deviation26 of the first differences
in cohort effects, i.e., ∆as+1 ≡ as+1 − as.27 As we discussed above, permanent shocks to
consumption cohort effects are equal to the log displacement factor in our model. The
second row of the table reports estimates of the standard deviation of permanent shocks to
consumption cohort effects, obtained using the methods of Beveridge and Nelson (1981) after
fitting an ARIMA (1,1,1) model to the estimated cohort effects. We report two additional
estimates of the standard deviation of permanent shocks in the next two rows. The third
row contains Newey-West estimates of the long-run variance of ∆as using 10 lags. In the
fourth row, we report the standard deviation of rolling ten-year averages of ∆as, normalized
by
√
10. The three estimates of the volatility of the permanent component of the cohort
effects are similar to each other. These estimates form target moments for the calibration
exercise of the next subsection.
The fifth and seventh rows in Table 2 relate increments in consumption cohort effects to
cross-sectional differences in stock returns. According to our model increments of the per-
manent component (the random-walk component) of cohort effects should co-vary positively
with the growth-value return differential. We compute this growth-value return differential
by taking the log-gross return differential between the low and high book-to-market portfolio
used by Fama and French (1993) in their construction of the “HML” factor. In the fifth row
of Table 2 we use the Newey-West variance-covariance matrix to estimate the covariance
between the permanent component of cohort effects and the growth-value return differential,
normalized by the long-run variance of the consumption cohort effects as obtained in the
26We use only cohorts from 1927-1995 for the calculations in Table 2, because cohorts prior to 1927 and
after 1995 are not sufficiently populated. With this choice of sample, the minimal cohort has 199 observations,
the first quartile of cohorts has 521 observations and the median cohort has 657 observations. Accordingly,
cohorts are sufficiently well populated so that our variance estimate of the first differences of cohorts is not
materially affected by sampling error. We would also like to point out that our estimates of the variance
of permanent components of cohort effects are less affected by (i.i.d) measurement error than the variance
of first differences, because heteroscedasticity- and autocovariance-consistent variance estimators control for
the moving-average error structure introduced by the noisy measurement of first differences.
27Note that ∆as+1 is identified up to an additive constant, and hence its standard deviation is identified.
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third row of the table. As a robustness check, we also report in the seventh row of the
table the results from computing the covariance of 10-year consumption cohort differences
and 10-year cumulative returns on the growth-value returns, normalized by the variance of
10-year consumption-cohort differences. We test the null hypothesis that growth-value re-
turns are independent from cohort differences. The sixth and eighth rows report the p-values
for the statistics in rows five and seven respectively using the block-bootstrap procedure of
Politis and Romano (1994).28 Besides providing statistical evidence in favor of the model,
the quantities in the fifth and seventh rows form targets for the calibration exercise in the
next section.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of Table 2. The figure depicts the estimated cohort effects
against the cumulative sum of the growth-value return differential,29 after removing a de-
terministic trend from both series.30 According to equation (39), the permanent component
of the cohort effects is identical to the (negative of) the cumulative sum of the log displace-
ment factor, which in turn should be correlated with the cumulative sum of the growth-value
logarithmic return differential. The left panel of the figure suggests such covariation. (The
right panel of Figure 2 is identical to the left panel, except that we split the sample into
pre-1945 and post-1945 subsamples and remove two separate deterministic trends in the two
subsamples.)
Table 3 reports further results on the relationship between consumption cohort effects,
innovation activity, and stock returns. Specifically, the first row in Table 3 reports the aver-
age difference between the log gross return on the first nine book-to-market decile portfolios
and the respective return on the 10th-decile portfolio. The second row of Table 3 reports the
estimates of the betas of these return differences with respect to the increments of the per-
manent component of log consumption cohort effects. Stocks in low book-to-market deciles
28We have implemented the procedure for average blocks of observations ranging between 1 and 10 years,
in all cases the resulting p-values are below 5 percent.
29We report the cohort effects from 1927 onward, since data on the Fama-French growth-value return
differential are available from 1927 onwards. We also report results up to 1995 because of the sparsity of
data on cohorts post 1995.
30As we noted above, linear trends in cohort effects are not identified. Accordingly, removing a linear
trend is simply a normalization.
26
(growth stocks) have lower average returns than stocks in high book-to-market deciles (value
stocks), which is the well-known value premium. The second row of the table shows that
displacement-risk exposure decreases across the book-to-market deciles, and therefore growth
stocks offer a hedge against the displacement risk. The third row explores an additional im-
plication of the model, namely that the return differential between value and growth stocks
is related to innovation activity. Using increases in the aggregate stock of trademarks as a
proxy for innovation activity, we report the betas of portfolio differentials on the (percent-
age) increments in trademarks.31 The declining pattern of these betas is consistent with the
model.32
The extended appendix (Section ??) explores in yet another way the plausibility of the
link between the value-growth differential and technological innovation. According to our
theory, epochs of large technological innovation should be associated with a low value-growth
return differential. Accepting the popular notion that the late eighties and the nineties were
times of accelerated technological innovation due to the IT revolution, we argue that this
differential declined substantially during that period. Moreover, we find that this decline
was not just an aberration of the US data, but is also present in international data. This
internationally correlated decline in the relative performance of value and growth stocks is
consistent with the notion of accelerated displacement due to the world-wide spread of IT.
Since the displacement risk in the model is generated partly by shocks to agents’ human
capital, as an additional test of the model’s mechanism we estimated cohort effects in indi-
vidual earned income.33 (Indeed, equations (10) and (11) imply the presence of cohort effects
in income data that should be correlated with the cumulative return of a growth-minus-value
portfolio.) Consistent with the model, the results using earned-income cohort effects are very
similar to the results using consumption cohort effects and we omit them to save space.
31We are grateful to Frederico Belo for providing us the data on trademarks and suggesting this additional
test of the model’s mechanism.
32These betas remain practically unchanged when we include aggregate consumption growth as an addi-
tional regressor and compute “multi-factor betas”.
33We define earned income as disposable income net of capital gains, dividends, taxes and transfers. We
relate earned income to stock market returns in the same manner as we did with consumption cohort effects.
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Before proceeding with a calibration of the model, we make two final remarks on the ro-
bustness of identifying displacement risk through the permanent component of consumption
cohort effects.
First, by using cohort analysis, we can overcome the small number of observations per-
household in the CEX. Specifically, the CEX is not a true panel of consumption growth.
Instead, it is a repeated cross-section, and it provides information for the consumption of
the same household for at most a year. Existing literature (e.g., Cogley (2002)) has used
the three quarterly observations of consumption growth available per household in the CEX
to form a measure of the average quarterly consumption growth of existing agents. As we
show in the extended appendix (Section ??), this quarterly measure of “existing” agents’
consumption growth is likely to lead to non-robust asset-pricing inferences if some agents
are sluggish in adjusting their consumption. In the extended appendix, we illustrate our
results for the special case where sluggishness is due to inattention, but similar arguments
would apply for other short-run frictions. We also show that our methodology, which bases
inferences on the permanent component of cohort effects, is robust to such short-run frictions.
Second, our focus on the permanent component of cohort effects makes our model robust
to certain stylized assumptions of the model. To give an example, the model assumes that
the benefits of innovation accrue to the incoming generation. In reality it is likely that not
only the current incoming generation profit from innovation, but also generations “close”
to the incoming one. The extended appendix (Section ??) considers such an extension,
whereby innovation acts as a positive endowment shock not just for the incoming generation
but also for some existing agents. Similar to the incoming generations’ inability to trade in
markets before it is born, existing agents are prevented from fully trading the innovation-
related risks because of borrowing constraints early in life. We find that extending the
model in such a direction alters the short-run dynamics of cohort effects, and changes the
short-run dynamics of the stochastic discount factor. However, the permanent component of
cohort effects still reflects the permanent variations in the stochastic discount factor due to
imperfect intergenerational risk sharing. Indeed, this link between the permanent component
of cohort effects and the stochastic discount factor continues to hold in models featuring age-
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dependent, transient frictions that introduce imperfect correlation between the consumption
growth of existing cohorts. Since the permanent component of the stochastic discount factor
governs the behavior of long-run returns (Hansen et al. (2008)), our quantitative results are
likely to be robust to such realistic extensions, especially for returns over longer holding
periods.
5.2 Calibration
Our empirical results suggest that the key predictions of the model are qualitatively consis-
tent with the data. In this section we assess whether the model can account quantitatively
for the empirical relationships between asset returns, aggregate consumption growth, and
consumption cohort effects.
Our parameter choices are summarized in Table 4. The values of µ and σ are chosen
to approximately match the moments of aggregate consumption growth. The parameter
α controls the share of profits in aggregate income in the model, according to equation
(43). We set α = 0.8, which implies a profit share of 16%. In yearly NIPA data for the
U.S. since 1929, the average share of (after-depreciation) profits and interest payments is
about 15% of national income, or 18% if one imputes that 1/3 of proprietor’s income is
due to profits.34 The parameter λ is chosen to capture the arrival of new agents. In post-
war data, the average birth rate is about 0.016. Immigration rates are estimated to be
between 0.002−0.004, which implies an overall arrival rate of new agents between 0.018 and
0.02. We take the time-discount factor to be close to 1, since in an overlapping generations
model the presence of death makes the “effective” discount factor of agents equal to β(1 −
34Since in our model there is no financial leverage, it seems appropriate to combine dividend and interest
payments. Moreover, it also seems appropriate to deduct depreciation from profits, because otherwise the
relative wealth of agents e and w would be unduly affected by a quantity that should not be counted as income
of either. We note here that our choice of a profit share of 16 percent is consistent with the real business cycle
literature, which assumes a capital share (i.e., profits prior to depreciation) of 1/3 and deducts investment
from gross profits to obtain dividends. Since, in stochastic steady state, investment and depreciation are
typically close to each other, the share of net output that accrues to equity holders is approximately equal
to the number we assume here.
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λ). Given a choice of λ = 0.02, the effective discount rate is 0.98, which is a standard
choice in the literature. The constant ψ influences the growth rate of agents’ marginal
utilities, and hence is important for the determination of interest rates. We choose ψ =
0.5 in order to approximately match observed interest rates. On behavioral grounds, this
assumption implies that an individual places equal weights on his own consumption and on
his consumption relative to the aggregate. In the online extended appendix (Section ??), we
investigate the model’s performance when agents have standard CRRA preferences. With
the exception of the interest rate, which becomes 5.7%, the model’s performance is slightly
improved along all dimensions.
In the real world, income is hump-shaped as a function of age, whereas in the model
age effects are assumed to follow a geometric trend. Since an agent’s initial consumption
— and hence the stochastic discount factor — is affected by the present value of earnings
over the life cycle, we calibrate δ so that, inside the model, the present value of income
computed using the empirical age-earnings profile coincides with the one computed using
a simple geometric trend with parameter δ. Specifically, we use the estimated age–log
earnings profiles of Hubbard et al. (1994) and determine δ so that
Es
∞∑
t=s
(1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
wt
ws
)
(1 + δ)t−s
(
At
As
)−ρ
= Es
∞∑
t=s
Λt−sGt−s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
wt
ws
)(
At
As
)−ρ
,
where Λt−s is an agents’ survival probability at age t− s+ 20 (conditional on surviving until
age 20) obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics and Gt−s is the age-earnings
profile, as estimated by Hubbard et al. (1994).
The innovation shocks ut are drawn from a Gamma distribution with parameters k and
ν. Parameters ρ and χ control the exposures of labor and dividend income to the shock ut.
We choose k, ν, ρ, and χ jointly to approximately match a) the volatility of the permanent
component of consumption cohort effects as reported in Table 2, b) the volatility of the
permanent component of income cohort effects,35 c) the volatility of dividend growth of the
35We obtain the permanent component of income cohort effects by using earned log income on the left-
hand side of equation (35), estimating the resulting cohort effects and isolating their permanent component,
as we did for consumption.
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market portfolio, and d) the correlation between dividend growth of the market portfolio
and aggregate consumption.
The parameter κ controls the proportion of growth opportunities owned by existing
firms, which are therefore tradeable, while $ controls the decay of existing firms’ growth
opportunities (low $ means that growth opportunities are front-loaded). As a consequence,
these two parameters jointly determine the aggregate price-to-earnings ratio, as well as the
return properties of growth firms. We therefore calibrate them to the aggregate price-to-
earnings ratio and the covariance between the growth-value return differential and the log
displacement factor, as estimated in the previous subsection. We chose this covariance as a
target in calibration because it is directly linked (through the consumer’s Euler equation)
to the average value premium. The online extended appendix (Section ??) documents that
our results are robust to alternative parameter choices, e.g., lower values of κ.
The parameter η affects only the relative weight of assets in place and growth opportu-
nities in firms’ values, but it does not affect any aggregate quantity. Therefore we use it
to calibrate the cross-sectional spread in price-to-earnings ratios between the top and the
bottom price-to-earnings deciles of firms.
We treat the risk-aversion coefficient γ as a free parameter and examine the model’s
ability to match a number of moments of asset returns and fundamentals for a range of
values of γ. As can be seen in Table 5, with γ = 10 the model can match the value premium
well, and it can also match about two-thirds of the equity premium. In interpreting these
results, it should be noted that the model has no financial leverage. As Barro (2006) argues,
in the absence of financial leverage the model-implied equity premium should be about
two thirds of the equity premium observed in the data (since in reality equity is levered).
Moreover, in the model there is no time variation in interest rates, stock return volatility,
and the conditional equity premium. Therefore, it is not surprising that the model needs
relatively high levels of risk aversion to match the data. However, even in the absence of
time-varying conditional moments of returns, levels of risk aversion around 10 explain a
substantial fraction of return moments. Therefore, the evidence in Table 5 suggests that
the model’s mechanisms are quantitatively powerful enough to match the salient moments
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of asset returns and macroeconomic fundamentals.
5.3 Inspecting the mechanism
Compared to standard, infinitely-lived-agent models of asset pricing, our model produces
larger equity and value premia. The main reason for this outcome is that current firms’
dividends are much more volatile than aggregate consumption, and exhibit a high exposure
to displacement risk — a risk that is priced.
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation helps illustrate this statement. Taking loga-
rithms of the pricing kernel in equation (24), using (4), (19), and the definition of υ(ut+1) in
equation (25) leads to
∆ log ξt+1 +const = (ψ (1− γ)− 1)εt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
std. dev.: 0.18
+ (ψ (1− γ)− 1) (1− α)ut+1 − γ log(υ(ut+1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
std. dev.: 0.24
. (41)
The numbers under the two components in equation (41) are the annual standard deviation
of each term. The stochastic component of returns on the aggregate stock-market portfolio
equals εt+1 + f(ut+1), where f(ut+1) is an appropriate function of the displacement shock.
The volatility of εt is 0.032 and the volatility of f(ut+1) is approximately 0.095.
In our model, the volatility of stock-market returns owes entirely to dividend-growth
volatility, which is equal to
√
0.0322 + 0.0952 = 0.1. The model generates higher volatility of
stock-market returns than that of aggregate consumption growth because future dividends
of existing firms are not co-integrated with future aggregate consumption, or even with
existing agents’ consumption. This lack of co-integration allows dividend growth to be much
more volatile than aggregate consumption growth, with both driven by permanent shocks.
Such long-run dynamics of dividends and aggregate consumption are mutually consistent.
Dividends of existing firms become a negligible fraction of aggregate consumption over time,
while the aggregate dividends paid by all firms at any point in time are a constant fraction
of aggregate consumption.
Given the above volatilities of the components of aggregate market returns and the
stochastic discount factor, if all these components were jointly normally distributed, then
the equity premium would equal approximately 0.18 × 0.032 + 0.24 × 0.095 = 0.029. The
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difference between this number and the equity premium of 0.04 in our base-case calibration
owes to the fact that the shock ut+1, and the terms dependent on ut+1, are not Gaussian,
making the consumption growth of existing agents and the stock-market returns co-skewed.
Finally, we would like to note that, while displacement shocks also affect equilibrium
pricing of risk by making existing agents’ consumption growth more volatile than the aggre-
gate consumption growth, this effect is relatively weak. We calibrate our model to reproduce
the empirical volatility of permanent cohort effects in consumption, thus identifying the ad-
ditional consumption volatility introduced by displacement shocks. The resulting volatility
of existing agents’ consumption growth is only slightly higher than the volatility of aggre-
gate consumption (0.039 versus 0.032). Thus, displacement shocks generate a high equity
premium by making dividends of existing firms and their returns strongly exposed to dis-
placement risk, not by making the consumption of existing agents substantially more volatile
than aggregate consumption. It is also noteworthy that the volatilities of both aggregate
consumption and existing agents’ consumption can be reduced further — without substan-
tively affecting our results — by reducing the volatility of the total-factor-productivity shock
t. Quantitatively, the shock t plays only a minor role in our calibration.
The above observations help us relate the optimal financial portfolio holdings of agents
in the model to the composition of their total wealth, in particular, to the ratio of their
financial capital to their total wealth. We provide a brief intuitive argument below and
present the mathematical details in the extended appendix (Section ??).
As we discuss above, the dividends of existing firms are more exposed to displacement
risk than the consumption of existing agents. Given that all valuation ratios and the
consumption-to-wealth ratios for all the agents in our model are constant in equilibrium,
it follows that the aggregate financial capital is more exposed to displacement risk than the
total aggregate wealth. Because the total aggregate wealth consists of the aggregate finan-
cial and human capital, we conclude that the aggregate financial capital is more exposed
to displacement risk that the aggregate human capital. Consequently, agents with high lev-
els of financial wealth relative to their total wealth exhibit a higher demand for insurance
against displacement risk than agents whose financial wealth is a relatively low proportion
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of their total wealth. An intuitive implementation of insurance against displacement shocks
is through a growth tilt in the agents’ stock portfolios, with the insurance premium given
by the equilibrium value premium. In summary, we find that in our model agents with rela-
tively high shares of financial capital in their total wealth composition implement a growth
tilt in their stock portfolios, while the agents with relatively high shares of human capital
implement a value tilt.
6 Conclusion
Innovation activity raises productivity and aggregate output. The benefits of innovative
activity, however, are unequally shared. In an overlapping-generations model where the
young benefit more from innovative activity than the old, and existing agents cannot trade
with unborn generations, we show that the process of innovation can give rise to a new risk
factor, the displacement risk factor. At a qualitative level, this factor can help raise the
equity premium in aggregate time-series data and explain the return differential between
value and growth stocks in cross-sectional data.
Cross-sectional consumption data allow us to test quantitatively for the presence, and
measure the magnitude, of the displacement risk factor. Our empirical results suggest that
displacement risk is non-trivial and is related to the return differential between the growth
and value portfolios used by Fama and French (1993) in their construction of the “HML” fac-
tor. Our calibration exercises suggest that this new source of risk is quantitatively important
enough to explain significant fractions of the equity and the value premia.
Our model abstracts from many elements of asset-price behavior, intergenerational trans-
fers, life-cycle effects, cross-sectional characteristics of firms, etc., to highlight the economic
intuition behind the displacement risk factor. Our framework can be enriched to incor-
porate some of these elements as well as extended in a number of other directions. We leave
such extensions for future work.
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Appendix
A Auxiliary Results and Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the intermediate-good markets. We first derive the
demand curve of the final-good firm for the intermediate input j at time t. Maximizing (6)
with respect to xj,t, we obtain
xj,t = L
F
t
[
pj,t
ωj,tZtα
] 1
α−1
. (42)
Substituting this expression into (8) and maximizing over pj,t leads to
pj,t =
wt
α
, (43)
while combining (42) and (43) yields
xj,t = L
F
t
[
wt
ωj,tZtα2
] 1
α−1
. (44)
Next, consider the labor markets. Maximizing (6) with respect to LFt gives the first-order
condition
wtL
F
t = (1− α)Yt. (45)
Substituting (44) into (3) and then into (45) and simplifying yields
wt =
(
α2
)α(1− α
1 + χ
)1−α
ZtA
1−α
t . (46)
We substitute equation (46) into (44) and then into (17) to obtain
xj,t =
1 + χ
At
(
j
At
)χ
(1− φ)α2
α2 + 1− α, (47)
LFt =
1− α
α2 + 1− α (1− φ) . (48)
Aggregate output is given by (19), which we derive by combining (47) and (48) inside (3). The
fact that piFt = 0 is an immediate implication of constant returns to scale in the production of
final goods. Equation (20) is obtained by combining (47) and (43) with (8) and (46). Total
wages wt (1− φ) equal (α2 + 1− α)Yt, which follows from (46) and (19). Finally, integrating
(20) to obtain
∫ At
0
piIj,tdj implies that aggregate profits equal α (1− α)Yt.
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Proposition 2 Let ζ be defined as
ζ ≡ β (1− λ)γ eµψ(1−γ)+σ
2
2
ψ2(1−γ)2
and consider the solution to the following system of three equations in three unknowns θe, θw,
and θg:
θe =
1− ζEt
[
eψ(1−α)(1−γ)ut+1υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg)1−γ
]
1− ζEt [e((1−α)ψ(1−γ)−(1+χ))ut+1υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg)−γ] (49)
θw =
1− ζEt
[
eψ(1−α)(1−γ)ut+1υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg)1−γ
]
1− ζ (1− λ) (1 + δ)Et [e((1−α)ψ(1−γ)−ρ)ut+1υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg)−γ] (50)
θg =
ζEt
[
e(1−α)ψ(1−γ)ut+1υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg)−γ
(
1− e−(1+χ)ut+1) (1− κ)]
1−$ζEs [e(1−α)ψ(1−γ)ut+1υ(ut+1; θe, θw, θg)−γ] . (51)
Here,
υ(x; θe, θw, θg) ≡ 1− θeα (1− α) (κ (1− e−(1+χ)x)+ (1−$)θg) (52)
−θw (α2 + 1− α) (1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρx) .
Assuming positivity of the numerators and denominators in (49) and (50) and positivity of
the denominator in (51), there exists an equilibrium with stochastic discount factor
ξt+1
ξt
= β
(
Yt+1
Yt
)−1+ψ(1−γ) [
1
1− λυ(ut+1; θ
e, θw, θg)
]−γ
. (53)
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove Proposition 2 we conjecture that the expression
cit+1,t+1
Yt+1
is exclusively a function of ut+1, and then confirm our conjecture based on the resulting
expression for ξt+1
ξt
. To start, we note that if
cit+1,t+1
Yt+1
is exclusively a function of ut+1, then an
appropriate function f(ut+1) exists such that the stochastic discount factor is given by
ξt+1
ξt
= β
(
Yt+1
Yt
)−1+ψ(1−γ)
× f(ut+1).
To determine cit+1,t+1 for a worker (i = w) under this conjecture for
ξt+1
ξt
we use (21),
(10), and the fact that ht,s = h (1 + δ)
t−s inside the intertemporal budget constraint (13) to
obtain
cws,s = hqs,sws
 Es
∑∞
t=s (1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
wt
ws
)
(1 + δ)t−s
(
At
As
)−ρ
Es
∑∞
t=s (1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
Y
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
t
Y
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
s
β−(t−s) ξt
ξs
)− 1
γ
 . (54)
Under our conjecture the expression ξt+1/ξt is a deterministic function of εt+1 and ut+1, and
it follows that the distribution of ξt
ξs
for t ≥ s depends only on t − s. The same is true for
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At/As and for wt/ws (by equation [46]). Therefore, the expectations in both the numerator
and the denominator inside the square brackets of equation (54) are time-invariant constants.
Hence, using (10) we can express (54) as
cws,s = h
(
1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρus)wsθw, (55)
where θw is defined as
θw ≡
Es
∑∞
t=s (1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
wt
ws
)
(1 + δ)t−s
(
At
As
)−ρ
Es
∑∞
t=s (1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
Y
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
t
Y
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
s
β−(t−s) ξt
ξs
)− 1
γ
, (56)
governing the ratio between the value of earned wages and consumption.
The initial consumption of new business owners born at time s can be computed in a
similar fashion. To start, we observe that
ΠI j,s = pi
I
j,s
[
Es
∞∑
t=s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
piIj,t
piIj,s
)]
. (57)
Our conjecture on ξt+1
ξt
and (20) imply that the expression inside square brackets in (57) is
a constant. Observing that As − As−1 = As (1− e−us) (from [9]) and that
∫ As
As−1
piIj,sdj =(
1− e−(1+χ)us)α (1− α)Ys (from [20]), and using (57) inside (16) gives
Vs,s = α (1− α)Ys ×
{
Es
∞∑
t=s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
piIt
piIs
)}
×
{
κ
(
1− e−(1+χ)us)+ (1−$)Es ∞∑
t=s+1
(
ξt
ξs
)(
Yt
Ys
)
(1− κ) (1− e−(1+χ)ut)$t−s−1} .
It will be useful to define
θe ≡
Es
∑∞
t=s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
piIt
piIs
)
Es
∑∞
t=s (1− λ)t−s
(
ξt
ξs
)(
Y
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
t
Y
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
s
β−(t−s) ξt
ξs
)− 1
γ
, (58)
which, in analogy to θw, governs the ratio between the values of future dividends (therefore
cashflows to an entrepreneur owning a value firm) and consumption, and
θg ≡ Es
∞∑
t=s+1
(
ξt
ξs
)(
Yt
Ys
)
(1− κ) (1− e−(1+χ)ut)$t−s−1, (59)
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which encodes the (normalized) value of growth options.
The maintained conjecture that ξt+1/ξt is a deterministic function of εt+1 and ut+1 and
equation (20) imply that θe and θg are both constants. Using (21) inside (14),
ces,s =
θe
φ
α (1− α)Ys
λ
{
κ
(
1− e−(1+χ)us)+ (1−$)θg} . (60)
Combining (55) and (60) and noting that s in equations (60) and (55) is arbitrary, we obtain∑
i∈{w,e}
φi
cit+1,t+1
Yt+1
= θe
1
λ
{
κ
(
1− e−(1+χ)ut+1)+ (1−$)θg}α (1− α) (61)
+hθw
(
1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρut+1) (α2 + 1− α) ,
which is a deterministic function of ut+1. Using (61) and h = 1/λ inside (24) verifies the
conjecture that there exists an equilibrium with ξt+1
ξt
= β
(
Yt+1
Yt
)−1+ψ(1−γ)
× f(ut+1) where
f(ut+1) is given by f(ut+1) =
[
1
1−λυ(ut+1; θ
e, θw, θg)
]−γ
. This proves equation (53).
To obtain equations (49), (50), and (51 ) we use the formula (53) for the growth of the
stochastic discount factor in the definitions (56), (58), and (59). We start by computing the
term inside square brackets in equation (57). Since
(
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ξi
)(
piIj,i+1
piIj,i
)
is an i.i.d random variable
for any i, it follows that
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)
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=
1
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(
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)(
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) (62)
=
1
1− ζEs [e((1−α)ψ(1−γ)−(1+χ))us+1υ(us+1; θe, θw, θg)−γ] ,
where the last equality follows from (53):
Es
[
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]
= βEs
[(
Zs+1e
(1−α)us+1)ψ(1−γ)−1 (Zs+1e−(α+χ)us+1)]
= βEs
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Z
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]
.
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Following a similar reasoning,
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and
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Finally,
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Yi
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× Et
[(
ξt+1
ξt
)(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
1− e−(1+χ)ut+1) (1− κ)]
=
ζEs
[
e(1−α)ψ(1−γ)us+1υ(us+1; θe, θw, θg)−γ
(
1− e−(1+χ)us+1) (1− κ)]
1−$ζEs {e(1−α)ψ(1−γ)us+1υ(us+1; θe, θw, θg)−γ} .
Combining (65) with (59) leads to (51). Similarly, combining (58) with (64) and (62) leads
to (49), while combining (56), (63), and (64) implies (50).
Proof of Lemma 1. To establish that the equity premium is non-zero in the limit, it
suffices to show that
lim
α→1
cov {Rt, (ξt+1/ξt)} 6= 0. (66)
Since κ = 1, all stocks have rate of return
Rt =
(
piIt+1/pi
I
t
)
+ (Πt+1/pit+1)
Πt/pit
.
Equation (57) implies that (Πt/pit) is a constant. Therefore, in order to establish (66) it
suffices to show that limα→1 cov
((
piIt+1/pi
I
t
)
, (ξt+1/ξt)
) 6= 0. To see that this is the case note
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that limα→1
(
piIt+1/pi
I
t
)
= eµ−(1+χ)ut+1 . Hence, in order to establish (66), we need to show that
ξt+1/ξt is a non-degenerate function of ut+1 as α→ 1. Given that
lim
α→1
(
ξt+1
ξt
)
= β (1− λ)γ eµ(−1+ψ(1−γ)) [1− θw (1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρut+1)]−γ , (67)
the lemma holds as long as a solution θw > 0 exists to Equation (50), an equation that
simplifies to
θw
(
1− ζ (1− λ) (1 + δ)E
[
e−ρu
(
1− θw (1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρut))−γ])
= 1− ζE
[(
1− θw (1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρut))1−γ] . (68)
By expanding the right-hand side of (68), the equation further simplifies to
1 = ζE
[(
1− θw (1− (1− λ) (1 + δ) e−ρut))−γ] . (69)
As the right-hand side increases in θw, and the probability of the event {ut ∈ (0, )} is strictly
positive for all  > 0, conditions (26) and (27) are necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a solution θw > 0. (Note that θw ≤ 1.)
Proof of Lemma 2. Without loss of generality, we focus on the representative growth
firm. (A value firm is a special case of a growth firm with no growth opportunities). We
start by showing the following result.
Lemma 4 The (end of) period-t value of the representative growth firm created at time s is
given by
Pt,s = α (1− α)Yt
[
(Φ− 1)Nt,s + (1−$)$t−sθgΦ
]
, (70)
where
Nt,s = (1− η)κ
(
As
At
)1+χ (
1− e−(1+χ)us)+
t∑
n=s+1
(1−$) (1− κ)$n−(s+1)
(
An
At
)1+χ (
1− e−(1+χ)un) .
Proof of Lemma 4. The value of a growth firm is given by the value of all its assets in
place and all its growth options.
Pt,s = (1− η)κ
(∫ As
As−1
ΠIj,tdj
)
+
t∑
n=s+1
(1−$) (1− κ)$n−(s+1)
(∫ An
An−1
ΠIj,tdj
)
+ (1−$)
[
Et
∞∑
n=t+1
(
ξn
ξt
)
$n−(s+1)
(∫ An
An−1
ΠIj,ndj
)
(1− κ)
]
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Using the definition of Φ, and noting that
∫ As
As−1
piIj,tdj =
(
As
At
)1+χ (
1− e−(1+χ)us) along
with the definition of θg in equation (59) leads to (70).
The gross return on a growth firm Rgt+1 at time t + 1 is given by sum of the time-t + 1
dividends from all the blueprints collected by the firm up to and including period t + 1,
α (1− α)Yt+1Nt+1,s, and the end-of-period price Pt+1,s, divided by the beginning-of-period
price Pt,s :
Rgt+1,s ≡
α (1− α)Yt+1Nt+1,s + Pt+1,s
Pt,s
.
Using the definitions of Rat+1 and R
o
t+1, as given in the statement of the lemma, the gross
rate of return on any growth firm can be expressed as in equation (33), where wot,s is the
relative weight of growth opportunities in the value of the firm, and is obtained from Lemma
4 as
wot,s =
(1−$)$t−sθgΦ
(Φ− 1)Nt,s + (1−$)$t−sθgΦ .
Combining (20) and (19) with (31) and (32), we obtain that the return on assets in place
has a negative loading on the innovation shock,
∂Rat+1
∂ut+1
< 0, while the return on the growth-
opportunity component of the firm value has a positive loading,
∂Rot+1
∂ut+1
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. Equation (36) implies that
ais+1−ais = log cis+1,s+1−log cis,s+
1
γ
log
(
C
(1−ψ)(1−γ)
s+1 β
−(s+1)ξs+1
)
− 1
γ
log
(
C(1−ψ)(1−γ)s β
−sξs
)
. (71)
Using (53) inside (71) along with Cs = Ys and simplifying gives
ais+1 − ais = log cis+1,s+1 − log cis,s − log
(
Cs+1
Cs
)
− log
[
1
1− λυ(us+1; θ
e, θw, θg)
]
.
Using the definitions of as and zs, (55), and (60), noting that Cs = Ys, and simplifying gives
as+1 − as = − log
[
1
1− λυ(us+1; θ
e, θw, θg)
]
+ zs+1 − zs. (72)
Equation (39) follows immediately.
B Data Description
The CEX data are from the NBER website as compiled by Ed Harris and John Sabelhaus.
See http://www.nber.org/ces cbo/Cexfam.pdf for a detailed description of the data. In
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short, the data set compiles the results from the four consecutive quarterly interviews in the
CEX into one observation for each household. We follow a large literature (see, e.g., Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002)) and drop from the sample households with incomplete income responses,
households who haven’t completed one of the quarterly interviews, and households that
reside in student housing. To ensure that data selection does not unduly affect the results,
we also ran all the regressions on the raw data including dummies for reporting status and
the number of completed interview quarters. The results were not affected in any essential
way.
In terms of our definition of consumption, we followed Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger
(2007) and used a comprehensive measure of consumption expenditure. Specifically, we
used exactly the same definition as Harris and Sabelhaus. Our choice is motivated by our
model; according to the model, cohort effects are determined by the intertemporal budget
constraint of agents born at different times, so that total consumption expenditure seems
to be the appropriate concept for the estimation of cohort effects. To test if this choice
materially affects our conclusions, we also ran the results using consumption of non-durables
and services instead of total consumption expenditure. Using consumption of non-durables
and services, the volatility of first differences of cohort effects was larger; however, there was
not a big difference between the variance of the permanent components of the cohort effects,
no matter which concept of consumption we used, consistent with the view that the two
estimates of cohort effects share the same stochastic trend.
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No age effects Parametric Age Effects Age Dummies
Wald Test ∆as+1 −∆as = 0 31.3 4.21 4.25
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 52245 52245 52245
R-squared 0.373 0.382 0.384
Table 1: Results from regression of log consumption on time dummies (one dummy for each
quarter), annual cohort dummies, and various specifications of age effects. Cohort s is defined as
the set of individuals of age 20 in year s. In the first specification the regression does not contain
age effects, while the second specification allows age effects parameterized via a cubic spline. The
third specification allows for a full set of age dummies. The Wald test refers to the test that
as+1 − 2as + as−1 = 0 for all s. Standard errors are computed using a robust covariance matrix
clustered by cohort and quarter.
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Std. Dev. (Cohort−Lagged Cohort) 0.030
Std. Dev. (Perm. Component (Beveridge Nelson)) 0.023
Std. Dev. (Perm. Component (Newey West)) 0.020
Std. Dev. (Perm. Component
√
10(10-year Aveg)) 0.018
Cov(coh.diffs; growth-value)
Var( coh.diffs)
(Newey West) 3.92
p-value 0.026
Cov(10-year coh.diffs; 10-year growth-value)
Var(10-year coh.diffs)
3.43
p-value 0.048
Observations 68
Table 2: Various moments of the permanent components of the estimated consumption cohort-
effects. Cohort effects are estimated allowing for both time and age dummies. The “growth-value”
return differential refers to the log-gross return differential between the low and high book-to-market
portfolio used by Fama and French (1993) in their construction of the “HML” factor. The “p-value”
reported in the sixth and eighth row refers to the (one-sided) p-values for the quantities in rows
five and seven (respectively) under the null hypothesis that the growth-value return differential
is independent of the cohort differences. These p-values are computed using a block-bootstrap
procedure. Specifically, we simulate 50,000 artificial paths of growth-value return differentials by
drawing blocks (average block size: 5 years) from their empirical cumulative distribution function,
as described in Politis and Romano (1994). Then we compute the analog of the expressions in rows
five and seven (respectively) for each bootstrap repetition and use them to compute p-values.
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Portfolio 1-10 2-10 3-10 4-10 5-10 6-10 7-10 8-10 9-10
Mean log return -0.034 -0.020 -0.021 -0.026 -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 0.001 0.003
β1 6.293 7.162 5.609 4.995 5.125 4.184 3.090 3.474 2.636
β2 1.744 1.822 1.980 1.258 1.163 1.379 1.138 0.153 -0.129
Table 3: Average of returns on long-short book-to-market decile portfolios and their betas with
respect to the permanent component of consumption-cohort innovations (β1) and percentage in-
creases in trademarks (β2). The first row reports average annual returns. The label n-10 denotes
the average log return on a portfolio long the stocks in the nth decile and short those in the 10th
decile. The second row (β1) reports the covariances between these returns and innovations in the
permanent component of log consumption cohort effects, normalized by the long-run variance of
the latter. To isolate permanent components, covariances and variances are computed using the
Newey-West approach with 10 lags. The third row (β2) reports coefficients from regressing the
respective portfolio differentials on the percentage increase in trademarks. The data on returns
are from K. French’s website (Annual 1927-2010). The data on consumption cohorts are from
the Consumption expenditure survey. The compilation of trademark data follows Greenwood and
Uysal (2005) and covers the time-frame 1930-2000.
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β 0.999 k 0.25
ψ 0.5 ν 0.05
µ 0.015 ρ 0.9
σ 0.032 κ 0.9
α 0.8 χ 4
λ 0.018 $ 0.87
δ 0.012 η 0.9
Table 4: Baseline parameters used in the calibration.
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Data γ = 10 γ = 12 γ = 15
Aggregate log consumption growth rate 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
Aggregate log consumption volatility 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032
Riskless rate 0.010 0.022 0.015 0.014
Equity premium 0.061 0.040 0.051 0.067
Aggregate earnings / price 0.075 0.103 0.108 0.125
Dividend volatility 0.112 0.108 0.108 0.108
Correl. (divid. growth, cons.growth) 0.2 0.145 0.145 0.145
Std (∆aperms ) 0.023 0.027 0.026 0.024
cov(∆aperms , growth -value)
var(∆aperms )
3.92 4.24 4.39 4.72
Std (∆wperms ) 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021
Earnings / price 90th Perc. 0.120 0.111 0.118 0.139
Earnings / price 10th Perc. 0.04 0.041 0.039 0.042
Average value premium 0.065 0.064 0.081 0.105
Std. dev. of growth - value 0.127 0.110 0.110 0.110
E (Ra −Ro) 0.102 0.121 0.151
Table 5: Annual data and model moments for different values of risk aversion γ. Data
on consumption, the riskless rate, the equity premium, and dividends per share are from
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Data on the aggregate E/P ratio are from the long sample
(1871-2005) on R. Shiller’s website. The E/P for value and growth firms are the respective
E/P ratios of firms in the bottom and top book-to-market deciles from Fama and French
(1992). The value premium is computed as the difference in value weighted returns of
stocks in the top and bottom book-to-market deciles, available from the website of Kenneth
French (1927-2010). “Growth-value” refers to the differential log returns between growth
and value stocks, as described in table 2. We perform an analogous computation inside
the model. Std (∆aperms ) denotes the standard deviation of the permanent component of
consumption cohort effects as estimated in Table 2. Std (∆wperms ) refers to the cohort effects
of earned income. E (Ra −Ro) is the expected return difference between assets in place and
growth opportunities. Model-implied moments are computed by estimating expectations via
numerical integration whenever possible, otherwise by using simulation (10,000 years).
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Figure 1: Illustration of the allocation of new blueprint value
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Figure 2: Left panel: Consumption cohort effects and cumulative log-returns on a growth-
value portfolio after removing constant time trends from both series. Right panel: Same
as left panel, except that we split the sample into pre-1945 and post-1945 subsamples and
remove two separate deterministic trends in the two subsamples. A full set of time and age
dummies was used in estimating the consumption cohort effects.
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